Agora: Red Deer Polytechnic Undergraduate Journal
Volume 14:1 2023 Agora Conference Proceedings

The Questionable Nature of Religious Testimony
Brianne C. Campbell
Religion is something which has been prominent throughout history and modern times,
with many different kinds and denominations. From Hinduism to Christianity, religion has a wide
reach across the globe. Within many religions, there are individuals who others learn from. This
idea was popularised more so within Western organised religions such as Christianity. At the
forefront are those deemed as experts - perhaps not in the traditional sense of the word - such as
the Pope, priests, and other leaders in worship. Congregations will frequently look to these
individuals for guidance, and to assist in the formulation and development of religious beliefs.
These religious beliefs, however, also have the capacity to shape other kinds of beliefs. The
religious beliefs of an individual - or rather, an epistemic agent - have the capability to be reflected
in various behaviours and actions outside of worshipping a higher power. The question is, should
there be reliance on the testimony of these supposed religious experts? I will aim to argue against
this idea being a valid or beneficial way of developing beliefs and knowledge, largely from a local
reductionist perspective.
Epistemic experts are individuals in a particular field whom others believe as trustworthy
due to their experiences. The experiences of experts tend to fall in line with things such as having
conducted research, maintaining a particular standard of education, and/or holding a job within a
specific area. In realms such as medicine and science, there is relative ease in identifying the
credentials of supposed experts. One would more readily be inclined to listen to medical advice
from their general practitioner who has spent years acquiring a knowledge base, and typically more
years applying this knowledge, over an acquaintance employed in an area such as the culinary arts.
Individuals in areas like medicine and science can study things that can be readily observed and
reaffirmed through means pertaining to the senses; their focus is derived from what can be
perceived and supported by others in their field and a variety of technologies. In these instances,
we are given justifiable reasons to listen to the testimony of others. In these situations, "the layman
is the epistemic inferior of the expert (in matters in which the expert is expert)" (Hardwig, 1985,
p. 336). An individual may not have acquired information through their objective pursuits, but
there is little to no reason not to believe in what is being relayed by those with proven credentials.

Those deemed to be experts within the scope of religious institutions are somewhat
different in that they do not appear to follow the traditional definition of what an expert truly is.
There may be a reason to believe that there may be no true experts, only reputational ones.
Goldman (2001) defines a reputational expert as "someone widely believed to be an expert (in the
objective sense), whether or not he really is one" (p. 91). Followers of Catholicism, for example,
are led by the Pope, cardinals, archbishops, priests, and deacons. Congregations will look to these
individuals to assist in formulating and developing their religious beliefs. However, these religious
beliefs will also play a significant role in shaping beliefs in other areas. These religious beliefs can
extend to how an individual behaves, the things they value, and how they treat others.
How some churches are structured reinforces the idea that the formation of a belief system
is best served without counterarguments present. Children are taught to follow the Bible's
teachings or various scriptures. These teachings may be presented through pre-determined forms
of media and by particular religious community members. Many churches offer Sunday School or
other youth groups. Through these groups, youth are encouraged to follow a righteous, religious
path and may even be encouraged to direct inquiries to particular individuals within their
community. These specific individuals - typically pastors and other leaders - are deemed to be
experts, and as such, their testimony may be viewed as more valuable and trustworthy. There may
even be instances where community members, especially younger ones, may acquire testimony
pre-emptively. According to Zagzebski, pre-emption is, "the fact that an authority has a belief p is
a reason for me to believe p that replaces my other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply
added to them" (2012, p. 107). Frequently, in cases where pre-emption occurs, the speaker is
regarded by the listener as a type of authority of whatever domain they are discussing. In terms of
religiosity, it may prove more beneficial to adopt a model proposed by Jennifer Lackey. Lackey
has discussed the expert-as-advisor model, where the speaker "does not give authoritative
testimony or pre-emptive reasons for belief; rather, her testimony provides evidence for believing
a proposition and, in this way, offers guidance" (2018, p. 238).
The American Civil Liberties Union, a non-profit organization, has acknowledged that
"individuals and institutions are claiming a right to discriminate - by refusing to provide services
to women and LGBT people - based on religious objections" (n.d., para 1). While the ACLU does
not state which religious sects, in particular, have been involved in these claims, a number have
historically been critical of select groups of people. While it is clear that non-epistemic harm is
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present, it can be argued that there is likely to be epistemic harm in these situations as well. There
is reason to believe that if an individual were to utilize their religious beliefs to discriminate against
an individual, this would result in cases of not only the application of a credibility deficit to that
individual but also be directly connected to testimonial injustice. In this case, there must be
testimonial injustice as "we are committed to a definition of testimonial injustice as necessarily
involving prejudice, with the central case involving identity prejudice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 41). What
this statement means is that at its core, there is prejudice against the individuals' identity; in this
case, the identity would be related to sexual orientation and/or gender. Within her 2007 work,
Fricker details epistemic harm because there is an unfair inability to contribute to a societal pool
of knowledge, which serves as a detriment to both the speaker and the hearer.
Testimony can be a valuable method of obtaining knowledge in the right circumstance.
There is justified reason to doubt those who are not experts in a particular field, and one would be
justified in acknowledging the knowledge base of those who are. Nevertheless, it may be argued
that social factors can play a role in determining the credibility of a speaker and their testimony.
This view lines up with the idea that testimony can be reduced locally if there is a compelling
reason unrelated to the testimony itself to believe the speaker is trustworthy in a particular instance
(Fricker, 1995). Reductionism appears to open the door for the hearer to acknowledge the value of
testimony but still maintain some form of skepticism. For reductionism, it is essential for the hearer
to "trust in his or her own powers of observation (as well, perhaps, as his or her own powers of
inductive reasoning from those observations)" (Coady, 2012, p. 34).
Perhaps there is a reason for an individual within a church to trust the words of their pastor
when they preach about scripture. If the individual perceives this expert within their community
to be trustworthy, what reason would there be to disregard their testimony? When one looks at
situations such as receiving medical advice from a doctor, or even a friend relaying information
that they got a new pet, there are verification methods. However, when it comes to belief in a God,
the same verification methods are absent. Also notable is that many different denominations exist,
meaning that there is some form of deviation in the belief system. Because of this deviation, there
is reason to believe that, at minimum, some aspects of religion may be based upon interpretation
by the institution or the individual. Various members of one congregation can hold differing views,
despite hearing the same testimony. If one were to rely upon the expert's testimony within their
church regarding religious teachings, is this truly a form of knowledge?
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While not all religions or churches make efforts to dissuade their members from pursuing
knowledge and information that may conflict with or contradict their teachings, it is within reason
to state that there exist instances of this occurring. These efforts and cases of reinforcing the preemptive belief of testimony by experts - or perhaps, even reputational experts - are questionable.
Replacing a belief with those expressed by another, based on perceiving this second person as
being substantially trustworthy or more well-versed in a particular area, may prove damaging if
one neglects to follow a local reductionist view of trusting one's observations. Overt skepticism
could prove problematic in its attempts to explain why we should not trust the testimony of experts,
yet a global reductionist view may prove too grand in its claims. Assessing the legitimacy of
individuals' status as experts may prove beneficial, and treating experts in some areas as advisors
compared to authorities like Lackey may result in a positive outcome. Maintaining awareness of
the possible epistemic harm that can come from some religious beliefs, especially beliefs
developed from testimony, may assist in the reduction of pre-emptive beliefs in that particular
area.

References
American Civil Liberties Union. (n.d.). End the use of religion to discriminate. ACLU. Retrieved
April 14, 2022, from https://www.aclu.org/issues/religious-liberty/using-religiondiscriminate/end-use-religion-discriminate?redirect=feature/using-religion-discriminate
Coady, D. (2012). What to believe now. Wiley-Blackwell.
Fricker, E. (1995). Critical notice: Telling and trusting: Reductionism and anti-reductionism in
the epistemology of testimony. Mind, 104(414), 393-411. 10.1093/mind/104.414.393
Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing [eBook edition].
Clarendon Press.
https://www.google.ca/books/edition/Epistemic_Injustice/lncSDAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv
=0

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Goldman, A. (2001). Experts: Which ones should you trust? Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 63(1), 85. https://doi.org/10.2307/3071090
Hardwig, J. (1985). Epistemic Dependence. The Journal of Philosophy, 82(7), 335.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2026523.
Lackey, J. (2018). Experts and Peer Disagreement. In M.A. Benton, J. Hawthorne, &
D. Rabinowitz (Eds.), Knowledge, belief, and God: New insights in
religious epistemology (pp. 228-245). Oxford University Press. https://cpbuse1.wpmucdn.com/sites.northwestern.edu/dist/d/2354/files/2018/07/12_Benton_Chapter
11.V1.08-Nov-2017225y0p57.pdf?fbclid=IwAR39ixpk7J2cFrTpv654BRBYcqN4B0BuHeFunWh1q_Q19FSU
Rhn6ps1sGeM
Zagzebski, L. (2012). Epistemic authority: A theory of trust, authority, and autonomy in belief.
Oxford University Press.

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