Agora Journal Volume 11, 2020
Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology
Andrew Schultz
Winner of the Peter & Olga Raffa Memorial Award
G. E. M. Anscombe outlined in her seminal article, Modern Moral Philosophy, the
needed work to be done on human psychology in order to further our ethical discourse.1 This
work, focused on what motivates, limits and allows us to act morally has progressed massively in
the last 60 years, especially in the last 20 years.2 The works of Martin Seligman and Christian B.
Miller especially have focused on virtue and character, expanding the empirical literature
considerably.3 From this empirical work I would like to suggest that virtue ethics descripts
human morality in the most coherent fashion, and should be considered as a strong ethical
theory, even from a Deontological and Consequentialist point of view. Humans seem to be
driven by previous thoughts and habits, rather than consistent rational thinking which both
Deontological and Consequentialist traditionally presuppose. A fostering of these habits, into
virtues, can consistently, although not robustly, direct the moral behaviour of an individual.
Situationism is often used to attack this.4 It interprets experiments, such as the Milgram
experiment or the Sandford Prison Experiment, to suggest that circumstance is the largest
determining factor when it comes to moral action. I would like to suggest that this is partly true
but does not at all detract from virtue ethics. In the situationist literature, there are still
individuals that did not follow the majority and acted with more moral character. Critics of virtue
ethics will take this to show that even if virtue ethics exist in some form, it is rare, and thus fails
to be a strong normative theory.5 I will respond to this in two ways, first by outlining that rarity

G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33, no. 124 (1958): pp. 1-19,
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100037943), 18.
2
Naomi Ellemers et al., “The Psychology of Morality: A Review and Analysis of Empirical Studies Published From
1940 Through 2017,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 23, no. 4 (2019): pp. 332-366,
https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868318811759), 13.
3
See Christian B. Miller, The Character Gap: How Good Are We? (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2018), and Christopher Peterson and Martin E. P. Seligman, Character Strengths and Virtues: a Handbook and
Classification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
4
Candace L. Upton, “Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology: The Situationism Debate,” The Journal of Ethics 13, no.
2-3 (2009): pp. 103-115, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9054-2), 105 -106.
5
Upton, “Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology”, 108-109.
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does not imply failure, and secondly the importance of situation in forming character, and how
we can use that in forming more virtuous individuals. Further, these studies typically outline
human behaviour in extreme or new cases. Studies that do track character in less extreme and
familiar situations do show a correlation between character and moral action. From this I aim to
present an interactionist account of virtue, one in which our character is shaped by our situation
(and how we reflect upon it) and our response to situations are impacted by our character.
Any moral theory, if it is attempting to be descriptive in any sense, ought to care about
human psychology. One cannot possibly be asked to live under a moral obligation that they
psychologically cannot act on. Virtue ethics, out of the three main theories found today, outlines
the best understanding of human motivation and capability. That is due to its focus on the
individual, and how one acts from situation to situation. That is not to say Deontology or
Consequentialism do not stand as moral theories, or ought to be replaced by virtue ethics. Rather,
I would suppose that they could implement some degree of virtue and character into their theory
as a means towards their own ends. 6 A Consequentialist could easily adopt virtue ethics in order
to further bring good to the most people, and a Deontologist could easily adopt virtue ethics in
order to help an individual follow out their duty consistently. They are not incompatible. For the
purpose of this essay I will be adopting a view of virtue and character similar to the one outlined
by Christen Miller. For Miller, virtues are reliable. They serve as a predictive pattern for an
individual.7 This differs from classic virtue ethics, in that it does not outline a system in which all
actions, bad or good, are to be sourced in character. Instead, one can typically expect a person to
act according to a virtue they have consistently, but there will be exceptions. Certain situations,
for example, can lead a person to acting in a way that does not seem to be sourced out of an
individual’s character. For many, this is a serious problem for virtue ethics. Often, critics of
Virtue ethics – like John Doris – cite studies such as the Milgram experiment or other situationist
literature to outline the flaws in virtue ethics as a normative moral theory.8

Mary Crossan, Daina Mazutis, and Gerard Seijts, “In Search of Virtue: The Role of Virtues, Values and Character
Strengths in Ethical Decision Making,” Journal of Business Ethics 113, no. 4 (2013): pp. 567-581,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-1680-8), 569.
7
Christian B. Miller, The Character Gap: How Good Are We? (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018), 10.
8
Valerie Tiberius, Moral Psychology: a Contemporary Introduction (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis
Group, 2015),115-117.
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Although there has been some considerable research to show in many situations, an
individual is largely shaped by their environment regarding moral action, these studies fail to
track people from situation to situation. The studies that do track an individual’s moral actions
across situations tend to show the importance of character in moral decisions. 9 For example,
those who are rated at having a strong moral character,10 often are found to be judged as having
Organizational Citizenship Behaviour (behaviour considered to be moral), whilst those with
weaker moral character are often judged to have Counterproductive Work Behaviour (behaviour
considered to be immoral).11 These studies outline a different situation then what most
situationist claim are the case. This is due to the focus on character instead of situation. Several
other studies also show that character does play a role in making moral decisions.12 Secondly, the
situationist literature fails to explain for the difference between individuals with in the studies
themselves. For example, in the Milgram experiment, thirty-five percent of the participants did
not reach the final stage.13 What is the cause of this difference? If the situation is the same across
the board, it seems likely the individuals, and their character had something to do with it.
Yet if our character can easily be bypassed by certain situations (that is, for the majority
of people), is perusing Virtue ethics as a moral theory worthwhile? The fact that we seem to have
weak moral inclinations (especially in certain situations), outlines the answer: yes. Just because a
moral theory is not implemented well within society, does not mean it will not work. It seems,
rather, that we need to implement means in which we can strengthen our moral character on a
larger scale. Already I’ve shown that there is a clear relationship between character and moral
behaviour in the workplace. This can be fostered. Using an interactionist model in which
situation and character are both considered, one can strengthen their moral character through the
situations they put themselves in, thus becoming more morally resilient across all situations.
Mary Crossan, Daina Mazutis, and Gerald Seijts do exactly this in their paper, In Search of
Virtue: The Role of Virtues, Values and Character Strengths in Ethical Decision Making.14 They

Taya R. Cohen and Lily Morse, “Moral Character: What It Is and What It Does,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014,
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2443685), 68-69.
10
Cohen and Morse, “Moral Character,” 13. This study used a number of personality and moral models to get a
good grasp on moral character. These are similar to what Miller and Seligman outlined in their work.
11
Cohen and Morse, “Moral Character,” 11-12.
12
Cohen and Morse, “Moral Character,” 35.
13
Tiberius, Moral Psychology, 116.
14
Crossan, “In Search of Virtue”, 567.
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outline a system in which an individual may strengthen moral character.15 This “value-based
orientation”, as Crossan labels it, includes both situational pressure and personal values, traits
and virtues.16 From this they offer a view that includes both situation and character, in which an
individual can self-reflect on a situation, in turn shaping character, which will impact future
moral action in different situations. A model like this explains the startling findings in the
Milgram experiment rather well. Without prior experience in a moral situation of that found
during the Milgram experiment (or similarly the Stanford Prison Experiment), an individual will
act according to whatever familiar situational guide they can find – in both cases it was the
authoritative figure behind the experiment. The situation in which they were put in gave them
very little time to reliably reflect on what they were doing, and instead those tested went with the
clear moral action, from their perspective, that is respect of authority. Evidence of this is found
by looking at an interview from the original Milgram experiment. Joseph Dimow points to his
failure to go further in the experiment “to a suspicion of authority born out of early experiences
in political and military organizations.”17 Virtues, thus can act as a “buffer” against situational
pressures that may lead to negative outcomes. 18 Adopting a theory outlined by Mary Crossan,
Daina Mazuits, and Gerald Seijts in larger scale could easily provide a strong framework from
which individuals could practice moral growth, and thus become more virtuous agents across
many more situations.
With the considerations and evidence outlined above, virtue ethics clearly has a role to
play when attempting to act morally. Even from a Deontological or Utilitarian point of view, the
massive impact virtue ethics could have on an individuals moral decision making ought to be
considered. Although the way that we have come to understand character, virtue, and the role
these play in ethical situations has largely changed since Aristotle, virtues are still consistent,
reliable, and cross-situational factors when it comes to moral decisions making The situationist
critique, rather than pose a threat for virtue ethics, refines it and outlines the need for a stronger
implementation within society. Self-reflective, integrationist models, such as the one proposed
by Crossan, can serve as a means in which virtue can be fostered within an individual, ideally
leading to a society where people are more resilient to the bombardment of situational pressures.
Crossan, “In Search of Virtue”, 568.
Crossan, “In Search of Virtue,” 573.
17
Crossan, “In Search of Virtue,” 575.
18
Crossan, “In Search of Virtue,” 575.
15
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Yet even if that does not occur, virtue ethics is clearly not irrelevant on a personal level, and still
serves as a strong moral theory for any individual seeking a more ethical life.

Bibliography

Anscombe, G. E. M. “Modern Moral Philosophy.” Philosophy 33, no. 124 (1958): 1–19.
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100037943.
Cohen, Taya R., and Lily Morse. “Moral Character: What It Is and What It Does.” SSRN Electronic
Journal, 2014. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2443685.
Crossan, Mary, Daina Mazutis, and Gerard Seijts. “In Search of Virtue: The Role of Virtues,
Values and Character Strengths in Ethical Decision Making.” Journal of Business
Ethics 113, no. 4 (2013): 567–81. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-1680-8.
Ellemers, Naomi, Jojanneke Van Der Toorn, Yavor Paunov, and Thed Van Leeuwen. “The
Psychology of Morality: A Review and Analysis of Empirical Studies Published From 1940
Through 2017.” Personality and Social Psychology Review 23, no. 4 (2019): 332–66.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868318811759.
Miller, Christian B. The Character Gap: How Good Are We? New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, 2018.
Peterson, Christopher, and Martin E. P. Seligman. Character Strengths and Virtues: a Handbook
and Classification. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Tiberius, Valerie. Moral Psychology: a Contemporary Introduction. New York: Routledge, Taylor
& Francis Group, 2015.
Upton, Candace L. “Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology: The Situationism Debate.” The Journal
of Ethics 13, no. 2-3 (2009): 103–15. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9054-2.

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